

EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT
Routing Slip

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3	EXDIR				
4	D/ICS				
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15	D/OEA				
16	C/PAD/OEA				
17	SA/IA				
18	AO/DCI				
19	C/IPD/OIS				
20	CCS/ICS		✓ ATT		
21	C/CI/DO		✓		
22	C/COMEX		✓		
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
FILE

Executive Secretary
2/23/83
Date

**United States
Information
Agency**

Director

Washington, D.C. 20547

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February 18, 1983

Dear Bill:

Thank you for your very cogent and thoughtful response to my letters of January 21 and February 2 on the question of how to achieve "strict" or "full reciprocity" in exchanges with the Soviets.

For your information and per our correspondence, I sent the attached memorandum entitled, "NSDD 75 on 'U.S. Relations with the USSR'," to Bill Clark on February 14. (See attachment A.) The memo contains suggestions on how "full reciprocity" in exchanges with the Soviets might be achieved, and quotes your suggestions.

Once again, I would like to express my appreciation for your assistance in this matter.

Best regards.

Sincerely,

Charles Z. Wick

The Honorable
William J. Casey
Director
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C. 20505

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February 18, 1983
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February 14, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Honorable
Judge William F. Clark

FROM: Charles Z. Wick

SUBJECT: NSDD 75 on "U.S. Relations with the USSR"

We have received a copy of NSDD 75 on "U.S. Relations with the USSR," and are pleased to note that the language I suggested on the need for "full reciprocity" in exchanges has been included on page 6, paragraph 3.

My December 22 memorandum to you, "Subject: The NSC Meeting on the Proposed NSDD on U.S. Policy Toward the Soviet Union, December 16, 1982," (see attachment A) suggested that:

"to achieve this strict ideological 'reciprocity' there might be a need to prepare the way either for executive action, such as the withholding of visas, or legislation."

This observation was made on the premise that "...the Soviets should not be allowed to exploit our pluralistic system and private sector mechanisms." The further question was asked: "Should we do anything about this? If so, what are we going to do?"

I am writing to you now to suggest an answer to my own question.

In 22 U.S.C. 2691 (d) (supp. V 1976), it is stated that:

"The Secretary of State may refuse to recommend a waiver for aliens from signatory countries which are not in substantial compliance with the provisions of the Helsinki Final Act, particularly the human rights and humanitarian affairs provisions."

The amendment cited above forms the basis as to how the language on maintaining "full reciprocity" in exchanges contained in NSDD 75, page 6, paragraph 3, might be implemented.

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Thus, on a selective basis the Administration may wish to deny visas to Soviet cultural and exchange groups as a way of maintaining the "strict reciprocity" called for in NSDD 75.*

In response to my request of FBI Director, William Webster's office, several members of my staff met with James C. McLay, a senior representative from the FBI, to ascertain security problems caused by Soviet exchange groups travelling to the U.S. Mr. McLay noted that the number of Soviet "intelligence affiliated" individuals travelling to the U.S. with exchange groups had increased by 57% in FY '82, compared to the previous fiscal year.

According to the FBI, even though the number of Soviet exchange groups visiting the U.S. in FY '82 decreased by 14% over the previous year, the total number of people within these groups in FY '82 increased by 22%. Within specialized academic groups visiting the U.S. to attend seminars, particularly on peace and disarmament issues, the number of KGB operatives has risen by 50%.

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This memo to you has been discussed with the FBI's Mr. McLay. Mr. McLay stated that the FBI would be supportive of USIA's concerns as expressed here.

I also conveyed our concerns to Bill Casey together with the FBI view. In his reply to my letters of January 21 and February 2, (see attachment B) Bill has validated both our assertion of the problem and its magnitude, as perceived by the FBI. Casey states in his letter:

* In different places in the document, the NSDD refers to "strict" and "full" reciprocity, using the two adjectives interchangeably.)

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"I endorse your efforts to achieve strict or full reciprocity in the total range of visits, and I believe your suggested modifications to NSDD-75 were very beneficial."

"I share your concerns and those of the FBI in these areas and will gladly work with you to develop and utilize appropriate mechanisms for more effective controls and greater reciprocity."

He suggests that the way to achieve visa control

"...would be to compel at least the Soviets to funnel all proposals for exchange visits--private, cultural, business, students, etc. -- through a central U.S. Government apparatus."

Bill goes on to propose that the new Office of Foreign Missions (OFM) within the State Department might take on the responsibility of becoming a central visit-clearing point, since no such point exists in the Government at this time. He concludes:

"If we should find the OFM able to assume this role, the matter of visa control that you suggest could follow as a natural result...I will pursue the matter of a central point through which all visits must be proposed and cleared."

(A one page extract of Bill's letter, with pertinent block quotes for your convenience is enclosed herein at Tab C.)

Since commencing our discussion with the FBI and CIA, I have received a very persuasive cable from Ambassador Hartman in Moscow. (Moscow 1331. The State Department's Executive Secretariat informed us that a copy was sent to you on February 10, at our request.) He advocates the renegotiation of a cultural agreement with the Soviets. Among Ambassador Hartman's reasons for his recommendations are the following:

1. "In the absence of an exchange agreement, we lack a framework for assuring reciprocity in the encounter between our open and the Soviet closed society."

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2. "If we open up official exchanges again we can continue to control them closely; at the same time, opening up the official channel will make it easier to clamp down on the private side, which is harder for us to police."
3. "Thus, in implementing the NSDD, I believe we should move toward negotiation of an umbrella/framework agreement under which a broad range of academic, cultural, informational and scientific/technological exchanges could function in a controlled manner."

In summary, the controls on unmanageable Soviet "intelligence-affiliated" individuals could be maintained through a selective visa denial, or by means of an agreement with the USSR. Obviously, however, any agreement with the Soviets would have to afford the kind of leverage and control needed.

The foregoing is for your consideration and whatever action you deem appropriate. Please let me know if USIA can be of further assistance.

cc: Kenneth W. Dan

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